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PROPORTIONAL DISCOVERY’S ANTICIPATED IMPACT AND
UNANTICIPATED OBSTACLE
Gregory L. Waterworth*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the last hours of 2015, Chief Justice Roberts did as he has done
each year before: he released a year-end report.1 Despite the routine
of the reports, 2015’s seemed different.2 The report was not the
typical recitation of case statistics and policy determinations.3 The
report was a poetic call to action.4 It cut to the core of the adversarial
nature of litigation by analogizing civil litigators with the duelers of
old.5 Although not a terribly unique analogy,6 the report focused less
on the adversarial roles of the individuals and, instead, scrutinized the
*

1.

2.

3.

4.
5.

6.

J.D. Candidate, May 2018, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A.,
Government and Politics, 2013, University of Maryland. A very special thank you
to the tireless and devoted work of the University of Baltimore Law Review team and
to the faculty that helped create this Comment. The author dedicates this Comment
to his loving family, friends, and dog—Norman.
JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2015),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2015year-endreport.pdf
[hereinafter 2015 YEAR-END REPORT]. The tradition began with Chief Justice
Warren Burger in 1970. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2009 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (2009), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/20
09year-endreport.pdf.
Compare 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 13–16 (detailing the caseload of
the federal courts), with John G. Roberts, Jr., 2003 Year-End Report on the Federal
Judiciary, SUP. CT. U.S. (Jan. 1, 2004) [hereinafter 2003 Year-End Report],
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2003year-endreport.aspx
(discussing the relationship between Congress and the Federal Judiciary), and JOHN
G. ROBERTS, JR., 2004 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 2–3 (2005),
https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2004year-endreport.pdf
[hereinafter 2004 YEAR-END REPORT] (outlining the federal judicial budget crisis).
Compare 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1 (discussing the 2015 amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure), with 2003 Year-End Report, supra note 2
(discussing the Federal Judiciary’s budget, relationship with Congress, caseload, and
various agencies), and 2004 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 2 (discussing the Federal
Judiciary’s budget crisis, caseload, and various agencies).
See 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 9–10.
Id. at 11–12 (“We should not miss the opportunity to help ensure that federal court
litigation does not degenerate into wasteful clashes over matters that have little to do
with achieving a just result.”).
See Lawyers or Modern Day Duelers, ALBION C. HIST. BLOG (Apr. 18, 2016),
https://mhancockparmer.wordpress.com/2016/04/18/lawyers-or-modern-dayduelers/.
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rules that govern both dueling and litigation.7 Chief Justice Roberts
highlighted the 2015 amendments to the rules that govern the practice
of civil litigation, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules).8
The 2015 Year-End Report explained how past “rules amendments
[were] modest and technical, even persnickety,” but noted that the
2015 amendments were different.9 They “mark[ed] significant
change, for both lawyers and judges, in the future conduct of civil
trials.”10
The 2015 amendments marked an attempt by the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules (the Advisory Committee) to address the
growing concern that “in many cases civil litigation has become too
expensive, time-consuming, and contentious,” and that these growing
burdens were ultimately “inhibiting effective access to the courts.”11
A symposium, sponsored by the Advisory Committee to explore
these concerns,12
identified the need for procedural reforms that would: (1)
encourage greater cooperation among counsel; (2) focus
discovery—the process of obtaining information within the
control of the opposing party—on what is truly necessary to
resolve the case; (3) engage judges in early and active case
management; and (4) address serious new problems
associated with vast amounts of electronically stored
information.13
In a sense, the needed reforms flowed against the very adversarial
nature of litigation that warranted comparison with duels.14 And if
duelers are an apt parallel to litigators, then a litigator’s ammunition
is rightfully the tool of discovery.15 Many contended that modern
reliance on electronic discovery proved the language of Rule
26(b)(1), which defines the scope of discovery, to be too broad.16
Proponents of change believed that this broad language was the

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

See 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 1–2, 5–9 (providing a discussion on
the now-antiquated rules of dueling).
Id. at 4–9.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 4.
See infra Section II.C.1.
2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 4–5.
See id. at 3.
See id. at 1–7.
See infra Section II.B.
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source of increasing litigation time and expense.17 The Advisory
Committee agreed with the proponents of change, and after years of
drafting and debate, a new Rule 26(b)(1) was submitted for
adoption.18 The new Rule 26(b)(1) is but a shadow of its former
self.19 In an attempt to curb the much debated growing costs, the new
Rule 26(b)(1) supplanted the standards of the former rule20 with only
two considerations—relevance and proportionality.21
Despite the hopeful tone of the 2015 Year-End Report, it still
looked towards the future with healthy skepticism.22 Chief Justice
Roberts’s report continued with the tale of two Napoleonic French
officers who dueled at every given opportunity over a fifteen-year
period.23 The feud stubbornly persisted between the men as the
world transformed around them, and the original slight was all but
forgotten.24 The tale, just as the goal of the new amended rules,
served to cut to the heart of the adversarial nature of civil justice.25
Chief Justice Roberts concluded by calling on “the entire legal
community, including the bench, bar, and legal academy, [to] step up
to the challenge of making real change,”26 all while warning that
“[w]e should not miss the opportunity to help ensure that federal
court litigation does not degenerate into wasteful clashes over matters
that have little to do with achieving a just result.”27
This Comment will proceed in four parts following this
introduction. Part II will provide helpful information necessary to
fully appreciate the current Rule 26(b)(1), including a brief history of
the rules of discovery,28 an analysis of the former Rule 26(b)(1),29 the
circumstances which fostered the calls for amendment,30 and the
amendment process.31 Part III will detail the new scope of discovery
by breaking down the new Rule 26(b)(1),32 discussing proportionality
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section III.A.
See infra Section II.A.2.
See infra Section III.A.
2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
Id. at 11–12 (describing Joseph Conrad’s novella, The Duel).
Id. at 12.
See id. at 10–12.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 12.
See infra Section II.A.1.
See infra Section II.A.2.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.C.
See infra Section III.A.

142

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 47

in the context of discovery,33 and providing helpful examples and
scholarship on the application of proportionality.34 Part IV will
discuss how the courts have applied the new Rule 26(b)(1) in
decisions since adoption,35 the problems arising out of the
misapplication of old case law,36 and will provide a few guiding cases
that correctly applied the new Rule 26(b)(1).37
Lastly, Part V will review the impact of the amendment since
adoption, explore what is being done to promote the change, and
ultimately detail what needs to occur for the full impact of the
amendment to be achieved.38 Ultimately, this Comment will
conclude that the continued use of pre-2015 amendments case law to
define the terminology of the current Rule 26(b)(1) is inapposite to
the goal of the new proportionality standard.39 More specifically,
such holdings—especially the definition of “relevance” in
Oppenheimer v. Sanders—are no longer controlling over the scope of
discovery.40 Until the higher courts provide holdings which prohibit
further misapplication, the full potential of Rule 26(b)(1)’s
proportionality standard will remain unknown.41
II. THE HISTORY OF RULE 26(b)(1)
The 2015 amendments arose out of a concern that the former Rule
26(b)(1) could no longer control the scope of discovery under modern
circumstances.42 Understanding these circumstances helps to
appreciate the intended magnitude of the amendment.43
A. Rule 26(b)(1) Before the 2015 Amendments
As previously mentioned, many argued that the costs, time, and
contentiousness associated with civil litigation were increasing and

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

See infra Sections III.B–C.
See infra Section III.C.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Sections IV.A–B.
See infra Section IV.C.
See infra Part V.
See infra Section V.B.
See infra Sections IV.A–B, V.B.
See infra Section V.C.
See infra Section II.B.
See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (2015) (explaining the
genesis of the 2015 amendments, how they relate to previous amendments, and how
they arose at least partially out of a need to ensure proportionality in light of the
advent and proliferation of electronic discovery).
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that discovery was a cause.44 But not all agreed that a change was in
the best interest of justice.45 An understanding of the history of Rule
26(b)(1), the former Rule 26(b)(1), and the state of civil litigation
under the former Rule 26(b)(1) frame the uniqueness of the 2015
amendments.46
1.

A Brief History of the Rules of Discovery

Since the passage of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,47 the
Supreme Court has had “the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure” for the federal courts.48 In 1935, the first
Advisory Committee was formed to draft the first set of unified rules
governing the procedure of the courts.49 The first rules were finally
adopted by the Court on December 20, 1937,50 and were effective on
September 16, 1938.51 Since adoption, the Rules have ebbed and
flowed52 to best promote the resolution of federal civil cases on their
merits.53
Rules 26 through 37 have controlled discovery since their
creation.54 But the first set of rules, which took on the intensely
challenging task of codifying the best practices from English and
state courts for federal use,55 were understandably imperfect.56 This
was expected, so a means of amending was also created.57 The

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

54.

55.
56.
57.

See infra Section II.B.
See infra Section II.B.
See infra Sections II.A.1–2, II.B.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2012).
Id. § 2072.
4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1004, at 23
(2015).
Id. § 1004, at 27.
Id. § 1004, at 28.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s notes (2015). To be exact, Rule 26 has
been amended thirteen times since its adoption. Id.
Bernadette Bollas Genetin, “Just a Bit Outside!”: Proportionality in Federal
Discovery and the Institutional Capacity of the Federal Courts, 34 REV. LITIG. 655,
656 (2015).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37; see also 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2002, at 33–34 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining that Rules 26
through 37 “were intended to take the best of what were then modern English and
state practices for discovery and make them available in the federal court”).
8 WRIGHT, supra note 54, § 2002, at 33.
Id. § 2002, at 34.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (2012); see also How the Rulemaking Process Works, U.S.
CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulema
king-process-works (last visited Nov. 11, 2017) (describing the rulemaking process
and the amendment process).
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discovery rules underwent significant amendments in 1948,58 and
then again in 1970.59 The 1970 amendments drastically rearranged
the discovery rules.60 Before 1970, Rule 26 arguably only applied to
depositions, but after amendment, any confusion was clarified, and
Rule 26(b) took its modern place as controlling the scope of
discovery.61 The Advisory Committee’s notes from 1970 indicated
that Rule 26(b) now “regulate[d] the discovery obtainable through
any of the discovery devices.”62 After taking its controlling role,
Rule 26(b)(1) was almost amended in 1980,63 amended in 1983,64
technically amended in 2007,65 and most recently amended in 2015.66
While the exact nature of the amendments to Rule 26(b)(1) have
differed, their purpose was always the same—to foster simplicity67
and to “rein in popular notions that anything relevant should be
produced.”68
2.

The Former Scope of Discovery

Before the 2015 amendments, Rule 26(b)(1) read:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of
discovery is as follows: Parties may obtain discovery
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party’s claim or defense—including the existence,
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

64.

65.

66.
67.
68.

8 WRIGHT, supra note 54, § 2002, at 34.
Id.
Id. § 2003, at 35.
Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1970 amendment.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1980 amendment (“The Committee
has considered a number of proposals to eliminate abuse, including a change in Rule
26(b)(1) with respect to the scope of discovery. . . . [But] [t]he Committee believes
that abuse of discovery, while very serious in certain cases, is not so general as to
require such basic changes in the rules that govern discovery in all cases.”).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment (“Rule 26(b)(1)
has been amended to add a sentence to deal with the problem of over-discovery. The
objective is to guard against redundant or disproportionate discovery by giving the
court authority to reduce the amount of discovery that may be directed to matters
that are otherwise proper subjects of inquiry. The new sentence is intended to
encourage judges to be more aggressive in identifying and discouraging discovery
overuse.”).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment (explaining
that the Advisory Committee intended to make “stylistic” changes when it deleted
the word “books” and moved one sentence).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amendment.
Noble Roman’s, Inc. v. Hattenhauer Distrib. Co., 314 F.R.D. 304, 307 (S.D. Ind.
2016).
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description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any
documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons who know of any discoverable matter.
For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.
Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if
the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to
the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).69
The former rule can be broken down into three distinct parts.70
First, it stated that any material was discoverable as long as it was
nonprivileged and relevant to any party’s claim or defense.71 This
aspect of the former Rule 26(b)(1) is one of the few provisions that
carried over into the new Rule 26(b)(1).72
Secondly, the former Rule 26(b)(1) further provided that, “[f]or
good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to
the subject matter involved in the action.”73 The Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit noted that the “subject matter” standard was
designed to distinguish basic discovery regarding claims and defenses
from a broader scope of allowable discovery.74 The standard was
originally included in Rule 26(b)(1) “to involve the court more
actively in regulating the breadth of sweeping or contentious
discovery.”75
The third distinct part of the former Rule 26(b)(1) was that it
defined that “[r]elevant information need not be admissible at the trial
if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence.”76 The Supreme Court detailed
how the “reasonably calculated” standard, while acting as a necessary
boundary to discovery, prohibits discovery on claims and defenses
that have been stricken.77 Originally added to Rule 26(b)(1) in 1946,
the “reasonably calculated” standard was included by the Advisory
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2010) (emphasis added).
See infra notes 71–76 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2010).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2015).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2010) (emphasis added). This Comment will refer to this
provision hereinafter as the “subject matter” standard.
In re Subpoena to Witzel, 531 F.3d 113, 118 (1st Cir. 2008).
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2010) (emphasis added). This Comment will refer to this
provision hereinafter as the “reasonably calculated” standard.
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351–52 (1978). Oppenheimer
will be discussed in far greater detail later in Sections IV.A–B.
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Committee to clarify that inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay or
lists of potential witnesses, was discoverable.78
In summation, the former Rule 26(b)(1) defined the scope of
discovery as relevance to claims and defenses, defined relevance as
anything “reasonably calculated,” and allowed the scope to be
expanded, for good cause, to include anything relevant to the “subject
matter” of the issue.79 But as technology advanced, so did the strain
on the Rule first formulated in 1937.80
B. Was Change Necessary?
Many perceived that, just as the French Duelers fought until they
lost sight of the cause,81 civil litigation was devolving into a neverending series of meaningless clashes—never resolving the original
slight, but always delaying resolution.82 Empirical data83 supporting
change to the scope of discovery detailed that in a closed study of
3,550 cases,84 the median total reported discovery cost was $15,000
for a plaintiff and $20,000 for a defendant.85 Further data revealed
that the top 5%, or 177 cases, reported a median discovery cost of
$850,000 for plaintiffs and $991,900 for defendants.86 Surveys
conducted before 2010 within the Litigation Section of the American
Bar Association, the National Employment Lawyers Association, and
the American College of Trial Lawyers reflected a “general
dissatisfaction” with federal civil procedure, and many of the lawyers
surveyed responded that the rules were “not conducive to securing a
‘just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.’”87 The
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

84.

85.
86.
87.

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1946 amendment.
See supra notes 68–78 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 109–15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and
Discovery Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 716 (1989).
See infra notes 84–89 and accompanying text. Some of the cited surveys, data, and
opinions were formulated after the decision was made to explore amending the scope
of discovery. Although they were not drafted prior to any notion of amending and
they do not perfectly reflect the nature of discovery under the former Rule 26(b)(1)
or the legal community’s opinion of the Rule, they offer reflective insight into the
state of discovery under the former Rule 26(b)(1).
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON
THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 3 (2010), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites
/default/files/report_to_the_chief_justice.pdf [hereinafter 2010 DUKE CONFERENCE
REPORT] (terminating study in the federal courts by the end of 2008).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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corporate and defense-oriented attorneys surveyed generally viewed
litigation costs as too high.88 And damningly, all projections
indicated that the growing reliance on e-discovery will only increase
costs and burdens.89 Proponents of change emphasized the data
concerning the increasing costs and general disfavor of pre-2015
discovery,90 but the entire legal community did not support the
movement to amend.91
Professor Arthur Miller, a prominent academic and former
Advisory Committee reporter specializing in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,92 testified before the Senate Subcommittee on
Bankruptcy and the Courts of the United States in opposition to
amending the scope of discovery.93 Professor Miller argued that the
justifications for narrowing the scope of discovery are simply
“speculative, not empirically justified, . . . overstated,” and ignore
other systemic values, such as access to the judiciary.94 To many,
narrowing the scope of discovery constituted a “significant turning
away from the vision of the original Federal Rules of a relatively
unfettered and self-executing discovery regime—a true commitment
to ‘equal access to all relevant data.’”95 He noted that amendments
apply to all discovery, not just the “relatively thin band of complex
and ‘big’ cases.”96 Professor Miller concluded that while discovery
relating to electronically stored information is altering the sphere of
discovery, its use by defense interests as justification to narrow

88.

89.
90.
91.
92.

93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 4 (“The participating corporations reported that outside litigation costs account
for about 1 in every 300 dollars of U.S. revenue for corporations not in insurance or
health care. The respondents also reported that the average discovery costs per
major case represent about 30% of the average outside legal fees.”).
Id.
See discussion infra Section II.C.1.
See infra notes 92–97 and accompanying text.
Changing the Rules: Will Limiting the Scope of Civil Discovery Diminish
Accountability and Leave Americans Without Access to Justice?: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Bankr. & the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 7
(2013), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/CHRG-113shrg89395.pdf.
Id. at 41–48 (prepared statement of Arthur R. Miller, Professor, New York
University School of Law).
Id. at 42–43.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 45 (citing Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery
Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 684–86 (1998) (reviewing studies showing
that one-third to one-half of all litigations involve no discovery). But cf. John H.
Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform,
60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549 (2010) (arguing that discovery is “dysfunctional, with
litigants utilizing discovery excessively and abusively”)).
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discovery is just another instance of “Chicken Little crying that the
sky is falling. [And] [i]t is not.”97
Proponents of change further noted that not only had the nature of
discovery been altered, but caseloads increased as well.98 Federal
caseloads have substantially increased, along with the variety and
depth of subject matter.99 At the same rate, trials are becoming
rare,100 and discovery costs are disproportionally skyrocketing for
complex civil cases.101 One scholar concluded that the rules fostered
a system where “discovery often serve[d] less to acquire and disclose
information than to manipulate the opponent—to embarrass, exhaust,
and frustrate him.”102
C. Making Amends
The debate within the legal community was fervent enough for the
Supreme Court to take notice and call for the issue to be explored.103
1.

The Duke Conference

Heeding the call of the Supreme Court, the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure organized a symposium to explore
issues within federal civil litigation.104 On May 10, 2010, lawyers,
judges, and academics from across the country met to “explore the
current costs of civil litigation, particularly discovery, and to discuss
possible solutions” at what is now known as the Duke Conference.105
Attendees reviewed and discussed empirical data, scholarly papers,
and judicial programs in considering if issues existed within the
federal civil justice system.106 The conference’s report concluded
that “[w]hile there is need for improvement [within the Rules], the
time has not come to abandon the system and start over.”107
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

106.
107.

Id. at 47.
See infra notes 99–101 and accompanying text.
See Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 601 (2010).
See Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy: Restoring
a Realistic Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399, 399 (2011).
See Stephen B. Burbank et al., Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637,
658 (2013).
Schwarzer, supra note 82, at 713.
See infra Section II.C.1.
See 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 3–4.
2010 Civil Litigation Conference, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies
/records-and-archives-rules-committees/special-projects-rules-committees/2010-civil
(last visited Nov. 11, 2017); 2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 84, at 1.
2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 84, at 1.
Id. at 5.
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Attendees faced the challenge of determining how the judiciary could
make internal changes quickly enough to keep up with the rapid
changes of society and proposed numerous potential changes to the
rules, as well as determined points of consensus among the
participants.108
The Duke Conference focused its attention on pleadings, discovery,
spoliation, and judicial case management.109 As for the issues in
modern discovery, discussions “extended beyond the costs, delays,
and abuses imposed by overbroad discovery demands to include
those imposed by discovery responses that do not comply with
reasonable obligations.”110 “[O]verbroad and excessive discovery
demands,” “stonewalling,”111 “document dumps,”112 fishing
expeditions,113 “overly narrow interpretations of . . . requests,” and
excessive motions requiring response were all contemplated.114 In
all, the attendees uniformly agreed that rule changes were needed.115
The Conference’s report identified that what was “needed can be
described in two words—cooperation and proportionality.”116
However, a rule change alone would not suffice.117 A cultural buyin, supplemented by continued education, pilot programming, and
extensive data collection were necessary to foster the needed
changes.118
2.

“[F]ive years of intense study, debate, and drafting”119

So began the lengthy process of amending the Rules. The Duke
Conference generated forty papers and twenty-five data compilations
108.
109.
110.
111.

112.

113.

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 2, 4–5.
Id. at 5–9.
Id. at 7.
“Stonewalling” is a term used to describe the refusal to cooperate or answer
questions as a delaying tactic. Stonewalling, LAW DICTIONARY, http://thelawdictiona
ry.org/stonewalling/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
“Document dump” is a term used to describe the act of responding to discovery
requests with the over-production of a large quantity of data in an attempt “to hide a
needle in a haystack.” Document Dump Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/d/document-dump/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
A “fishing expedition” is “[a]n attempt, through broad discovery requests or random
questions, to elicit information from another party in the hope that something
relevant might be found.” Fishing Expedition, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
See 2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 84, at 7.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 10–12.
See 2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 4.
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on how the expense, time, and contention inhibited the effectiveness
of the courts in many cases.120 Following the Duke Conference’s
suggestions, the Advisory Committee began the lengthy process of
translating these suggestions into workable amendments to the
Rules.121 A subcommittee presented the first drafts of proposed
amendments in 2012.122 The Committee held public hearings in
Dallas, Phoenix, and Washington D.C., received input from more
than 120 witnesses, and reviewed more than 2,300 written comments
on the proposed amendments.123 The proposed amendments further
passed through the Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference, the
Supreme Court, and Congress before their adoption on December 1,
2015.124
This change has attracted the critiques of many, and articles
pertaining to the 2015 amendments flood scholarly reviews.125 Some
applauded the amendments as a modern means of addressing ediscovery,126 while others concluded that proportionality is an “antiplaintiff” limit to discovery.127 Despite the critiques following the
new amendment, one thing was certain—the switch to proportionality
review was a large step. The only question that remained was how
impactful would the change be?
III. THE NEW SCOPE OF DISCOVERY
A. The New Rule 26(b)(1)
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is
as follows: Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of
the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the
120.
121.
122.

123.
124.
125.
126.

127.

Id.
Id. at 5.
COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 25 (2012),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fr_import/ST09-2012.pdf [hereinafter
2012 COMMITTEE REPORT].
2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 5.
Id.
See sources cited infra notes 126–27.
See, e.g., Trevor Gillum, The Convergence Awakens: How Principles of
Proportionality and Calls for Cooperation Are Reshaping the E-Discovery
Landscape, 23 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 741, 745 (2016).
See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the
Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1086–87 (2015).
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parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources,
the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether
the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit. Information within this scope of discovery need not be
admissible in evidence to be discoverable.128
The new Rule 26(b)(1) can be broken into four elements: (1) the
addition of proportionality as a key factor defining the scope of
discovery and of six proportionality considerations; (2) the removal
of the list of discovery sources; (3) the removal of the “subject
matter” standard; and (4) the removal of the “reasonably calculated”
standard.129
The Advisory Committee notes that the new Rule 26(b)(1) restores
“proportionality as an express component of the scope of discovery”
to “guard against redundant or disproportionate discovery.”130 The
change to proportionality does not place the burdens of all
proportionality considerations on the party seeking discovery, nor
does it permit the use of simple boilerplate objections stating that a
request is not proportional.131 The new Rule 26(b)(1) further gives
six factors to be considered in applying proportionality: (1) “the
importance of the issues at stake”; (2) “the amount in controversy”;
(3) “the parties’ relative access to relevant information”; (4) “the
parties’ resources”; (5) “the importance of the discovery in resolving
the issues”; and (6) “whether the burden or expense of the proposed
discovery outweighs its likely benefit.”132 Not one of the six factors
is inherently more impactful on a court’s analysis.133 For instance,
monetary stakes cannot control the analysis, but must be balanced
against the other five factors.134
Perhaps as, if not more, striking than the addition of
proportionality, was the removal of controlling aspects of the former
Rule 26(b)(1).135 The first removal was the phrase providing for the
discovery of information about documents, tangible items, and
128.
129.

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (emphasis added).
Memorandum from Judge David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed.
Rules of Civil Procedure, to Judge Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on
Rules of Practice & Procedure app. B-4 (June 14, 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/st09-2014-add_0.pdf [hereinafter Summer 2014 Committee
Report].
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
Id.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
Id.
See infra notes 136–44 and accompanying text.
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possible witnesses.136
The Committee saw these words as
unnecessary because they described a “well entrenched” practice and
made the rule verbose.137
The Committee further deleted the “subject matter” and
“reasonably calculated” standards.138 As for the “subject matter”
standard, the Advisory Committee expressed that a few factors
prompted removal.139 First, the provision was rarely invoked.140
Second, the new proportionality standard would allow for the same
result.141 And lastly, the removal of the “subject matter provision”
prevented future interpretations that would extend the scope of
discovery contrary to the intent of the amendments.142 The
“reasonably calculated” standard was deleted because the standard
was “used by some, incorrectly, to define the scope of discovery.”143
Furthermore, the notes observe that “use of the ‘reasonably
calculated’ phrase to define the scope of discovery ‘might swallow
any other limitation on the scope of discovery.’”144
The new Rule 26(b)(1) removed any past provisions that could
arguably expand or redefine the scope of discovery leaving only two
considerations: relevance to claims and defenses and
proportionality.145 But the question remains: what is proportionality?
B. Proportionality Is Not a Stranger to the Rules
To begin, proportionality is not new to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.146 Many of the very considerations now provided to
review proportionality originally resided in Rule 26(b)(1) from 1983
to 1993.147 In 1993, the considerations were moved to Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(iii), which directed the court to “limit the frequency or
extent of use of discovery if it determined that ‘the discovery . . .
[was] unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs
of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties’
resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Summer 2014 Committee Report, supra note 129, at app. B-9.
Id.
Id. at app. B-9–10.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Summer 2014 Committee Report, supra note 129, at app. B-7.
Id.
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litigation.’”148 While initially added to address problems of overdiscovery, redundant, or disproportionate discovery, the Advisory
Committee Notes indicate that the proportionality considerations
failed to have their intended effect.149
C. So What Is It Then?
Although proportionality is not new to the Rules, the concept
remains elusive to the bench and bar.150 In fact, even Black’s Law
Dictionary lacks a definition for “proportionality” in the civil
context.151 The new Rule 26(b)(1) gives six seemingly exclusive
factors for a court to consider when determining the proportionality
of a discovery request.152 The factors can be inapplicable, neutral, or
even determinative depending on the specific discovery request or
dispute at issue.153 Moreover, each factor necessitates a factualintensive analysis.154
Despite providing factors, the list leaves many ambiguities due to a
stark lack of helpful case law concerning proportionality,155 and a
lack of uniform guidance on reviewing cases through a proportional
lens.156 This ambiguity as to what is actually proportionality may be
the largest hurdle the new rule must overcome,157 but for the
purposes of this Comment, a basic understanding of the concept is
only necessary for determining how effective the amendment has
been at achieving the Advisory Committee’s goals.

148.
149.

150.

151.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment)
(explaining that the proportionality considerations instituted in 1983 were intended
for the same purposes, but lacked impact).
See, e.g., David Crump, Goodbye, “Reasonably Calculated”; You’re Replaced by
“Proportionality”: Deciphering the New Federal Scope of Discovery, 23 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 1093, 1102 (2016); Elizabeth D. Laporte & Jonathan M. Redgrave,
A Practical Guide to Achieving Proportionality Under New Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 19, 23 (2015).
See Proportionality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The term is
defined in the criminal law context as “[t]he principle that the use of force should be
in proportion to the threat or grievance provoking the use of force.” Id.
See supra notes 132–34 and accompanying text.
Crump, supra note 150, at 1097–1101.
See id.
Id. at 1102–03.
Laporte & Redgrave, supra note 150, at 46.
See id. However, uniformly defining proportional discovery is not the purpose of
this Comment.
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A Helpful Example

A pre-2015 amendment example of proportionality in discovery
should serve as a helpful example to illustrate the concept. In United
States v. University of Nebraska at Kearney,158 Judge Zwart invoked
proportionality when reviewing the discovery requests of the
government.159 In a discrimination case against the university for
failure to provide housing for students with emotional assistance
animals, the government requested any electronically stored
information (ESI) pertaining to an extensive list of search terms.160
The university argued that if the terms were used “the defendants
would need to produce ESI for every person with a disability who
sought any type of accommodation from . . . [the university],
including students seeking academic accommodations, employees
seeking employment accommodations, and the general public seeking
accommodations for using . . . [the university’s] non-housing
facilities.”161 At the time of the decision, the university had already
spent $122,006 in processing the discovery requests, and the request
would ultimately yield 10,997 total documents.162 In response to the
growing costs of the discovery request, the court conducted a, then
Rule 26(c)(2)(C), proportionality review.163 The court’s analysis
hinged on the specific allegations in the case: discrimination by
prohibiting emotional assistance animals.164 Although the requested
information had relevance, the burden of obtaining the information
“outweigh[ed] its likely benefit.”165 Accordingly, the court denied
the government’s motion to compel discovery because the
proportional burden outweighed the benefit.166 The court reasoned
that other less costly discovery tools and means could be used to
gather the information, and that the request hindered the “just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination” of the case.167
United States v. University of Nebraska at Kearney serves as a
good example of proportional review.168 The factors considered by
Judge Zwart were similar to the six considerations outlined in the
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

No. 4:11CV3209, 2014 WL 4215381 (D. Neb. Aug. 25, 2014).
Id. at *3.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *3–4.
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amended Rule 26(b).169 With a helpful pre-2015 example of
proportionality, one can better review the cases that have looked to
the new amended Rule 26(b) since its adoption.
IV. THE OPPENHEIMER PROBLEM
Proportionality is now a controlling factor over the scope of
discovery in all future and pending proceedings, except in those
pending proceedings where application of the new rule would not be
feasible or would result in injustice.170 Yet, proportionality is not the
only consideration.171 Interestingly, the hurdle Rule 26(b)(1) now
faces in achieving its full potential comes not from proportionality,
but from its co-consideration—relevance.172
A. Boilerplate Beginnings
Among the early decisions to incorporate the new Rule 26(b)(1)
was Signatours Corp. v. Hartford on May 19, 2016.173 Signatours
pertained to a motion to compel the production of documents in a
copyright infringement action.174 Proportionality was not a deciding
factor in the case.175 In fact, the concept was never mentioned except
in the court’s quotation of the new Rule 26(b)(1).176 The failure to
review both relevance and proportionality under the new Rule
26(b)(1), however, is not why this Comment draws attention to the
decision; it is the boilerplate.177
Black’s Law Dictionary defines boilerplate as “[r]eady-made or allpurpose language that will fit in a variety of documents.”178 The term
boilerplate typically describes the usage of ready-made contractual
clauses,179 but has also found a place in judicial standards of
review.180 The practice of utilizing boilerplate standards of review is

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

180.

See id. at *3, *5.
28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2012).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
See infra notes 190–210, 265–86 and accompanying text.
No. 14-1581 RSM, 2016 WL 2930435, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 19, 2016).
Id. at *1.
See id. at *2–5.
Id. at *2.
See infra notes 178–92 and accompanying text.
Boilerplate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in
Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713,
715, 718 (1997).
Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of Review, 13
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 255–58 (2009).
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widespread.181 The systemic perception of standards of review as
boilerplate may be best exposed in one federal judge’s comments as
he discussed the role of court clerks in drafting opinions.182 The
judge explained that he would take a clerk’s draft and “make
substantial revisions to almost every paragraph, and about the only
statements of black-letter law that . . . [the judge would] leave
untouched . . . [were] boilerplate, such as [the] standard of review.”183
Comments like this show how many people in the legal community
view standards of review, and similar statements of law, as
boilerplate.184
Although not a standard of review in the typical sense,185 Rule
26(b)(1) is the standard for reviewing discovery requests, and thus
the same pressures apply.186 Standard legal language is a staple of
the law, providing balance of power, supporting judicial economy,
and standardizing the review of cases.187 However, Signatours
provides a clear example of the pitfall of using boilerplate.188 The
new Rule 26(b)(1) was incorporated into the language defining the
scope of discovery, but the case law used to explain the terminology
was old law created under the former rule.189 Following the block
quote of the new Rule 26(b)(1), Signatours continued by stating:

181.

182.

183.
184.
185.
186.

187.
188.
189.

See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Trading Votes for Reasoning: Covering
in Judicial Opinions, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 735, 752 (2008) (noting that appellate
courts often use boilerplate string citations that have been cut and pasted for the
standard of review); Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84
B.U. L. REV. 1, 37 (2004) (highlighting the use of boilerplate standards of review in
place of reasoned and explained analysis); Peters, supra note 180, at 255–58
(explaining that the frequent use of boilerplate language is one of the many issues
standards of review face).
See Arthur D. Hellman, The View from the Trenches: A Report on the Breakout
Sessions at the 2005 National Conference on Appellate Justice, 8 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 141, 188–89 (2006).
Id.
See id.
See generally Peters, supra note 180 (focusing on appellate standards of review and
their misuse).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also Michael J. Miles, Proportionality Under
Amended Rule 26(b)(1): A New Mindset, A.B.A. (May 18, 2016),
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/pretrial/articles/spring2016-0516proportionality-amended-rule-26b1-new-mindset.html (emphasizing the importance
of the new Rule 26(b)(1) to the discovery process).
Peters, supra note 180, at 238–41.
Signatours Corp. v. Hartford, No. 14-1581 RSM, 2016 WL 2930435, at *2 (W.D.
Wash. May 19, 2016).
Compare Estate of Zahn v. City of Kent, No. C14-1065RSM, 2015 WL 12712764,
at *1 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 10, 2015) (applying the pre-2015 Rule 26(b)(1) as the
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“Relevant information for purposes of discovery is
information ‘reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence’ . . . .” Surfvivor Media, Inc. v.
Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 635 (9th Cir. 2005).
“District courts have broad discretion in determining
relevancy for discovery purposes.” Id. (citing Hallett v.
Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002)).190
The court included into the new scope of discovery the very
“reasonably calculated” standard that the Advisory Committee
purposely removed.191 While Signatours may have been one of the
first decisions to do this, it has certainly not been the last.192
B. Old Habits Die Hard
At first glance, the use of Oppenheimer does not seem incorrect.193
But by scrutinizing Oppenheimer, one sees that the holding is not
simply defining the term “relevance,” but is defining “relevance”
under the scope and language of the former Rule 26(b)(1).194
Oppenheimer involved a class action against an investment fund for
artificially inflated pricing and brought to the Supreme Court
multiple questions concerning the procedure for handling class
actions and allocating the burdens of discovery.195 One of those
issues pertained to the class’s argument that requests to learn of more
potential class members fell under the scope of discovery.196 The
Court disagreed with the plaintiff class and held that requests of such
information did not fall under discovery, but instead fell under Rule
23(d)’s facilitation of sending notice.197 In doing so, however, the
Court defined the scope of discovery under the 1978 version of Rule
26(b)(1) and noted that “[t]he key phrase in this definition—‘relevant
to the subject matter involved in the pending action’—has been
construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that
reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue

190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

standard of review), with Signatours, 2016 WL 2930435, at *2 (applying the same
standard with the post-2015 amended Rule 26(b)(1)).
Signatours, 2016 WL 2930435, at *2.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment.
See infra Section IV.B.
See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 350–51 (1978).
See id.
See id. at 343–44, 349–59.
See id. at 350–52.
Id. at 352–56.
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that is or may be in the case.”198 But the “key phrase” to which the
Supreme Court construes broadly no longer exists.199
Judge David Campbell, in In re Bard IVC Filters Products Liability
Litigation, succinctly explained the nature of using law which defines
a prior version of a rule:
Amended Rule 26(b)(1) was adopted pursuant to the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 et. seq. That statute
provides that “[a]ll laws in conflict with such rules shall be
of no further force or effect after such rules have taken
effect.” Thus, just as a statute could effectively overrule
cases applying a former legal standard, the 2015 amendment
effectively abrogated cases applying a prior version of Rule
26(b)(1). The test going forward is whether evidence is
“relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” not whether it is
“reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.”200
Despite the likely abrogation of the Oppenheimer standards, many
courts continue to cite to it when defining relevance.201 The United
States District Courts of New York,202 Florida,203 Kansas,204
Louisiana,205 California,206 and Kentucky207 are creating a large
198.
199.
200.
201.

202.
203.
204.
205.

206.

Id. at 350–51 (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (1976)).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
317 F.R.D. 562, 564 (D. Ariz. 2016) (citation omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)
(2012)).
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Shamesh v. CA, Inc., 314 F.R.D. 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2016);
Lightsquared Inc. v. Deere & Co., 13 Civ. 8157 (RMB) (JCF), 2015 WL 8675377, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2015); La. Crawfish Producers Ass’n-W. v. Mallard Basin,
Inc., No. 6:10-1085 c/w 6:11-0461, 2015 WL 8074260, at *2, *5 (W.D. La. Dec. 4,
2015). A Westlaw case search performed on November 17, 2017, revealed 293
citations of the Oppenheimer standard in federal courts to define relevance in the
amended Rule 26(b) since its adoption on December 1, 2015. Albeit every case may
not be positively citing Oppenheimer, but this is still a high number of citations to an
abrogated holding.
A Westlaw case search performed on November 17, 2017, revealed that nineteen
New York Federal District Court orders cite Oppenheimer to define the rule’s scope.
A Westlaw case search performed on November 17, 2017, revealed that thirty-seven
Florida Federal District Court orders cite Oppenheimer to define the rule’s scope.
A Westlaw case search performed on November 17, 2017, revealed that twenty-three
Kansas Federal District Court orders cite to Oppenheimer to define the rule’s scope.
A Westlaw case search performed on November 17, 2017, revealed that twenty-five
Louisiana Federal District Court orders cite to Oppenheimer to define the rule’s
scope.
A Westlaw case search performed on November 17, 2017, revealed that thirty-eight
California Federal District Court orders cite to Oppenheimer to define the rule’s
scope.
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portion of jurisprudence that incorporates Oppenheimer into the new
Rule 26(b)(1).208 Although the incorporation of the Oppenheimer
standard is not facially inapposite to the amended rule, the continued
use of old case law to define relevance is creating a hurdle in
realizing the full impact of the new scope of discovery.209 The
Oppenheimer definition of relevance is one that incorporates the very
broad and liberal scope of discovery that the amendment purposefully
removed.210
C. Righting the Ship
Not all courts are applying the old law to the new rule.211 One of
the first decisions to grasp and apply the amended Rule 26(b)(1) as
intended was Sibley v. Choice Hotels International.212 A simple bed
bugs case fostered tremendous discovery costs due to the “continual
bickering and litigation over minor filing deadlines, and discovery
disputes focused on form instead of substance,” which led to “over 70
docket entries in the case. Presently, there are 83 docket entries, and
the pending motions to compel and extend discovery are the tenth
and eleventh motions interposed.”213
The Sibley Court gave a comprehensive, but keen, description of
the amendments to 26(b)(1) and noted that “the discretionary
authority to allow discovery of ‘any matter relevant to the subject
matter involved in the action’ has been eliminated.”214 The court
then used the new proportionality standard to hold that the extensive
discovery requests were disproportional to the needs of the case,
denied all motions set forth for consideration, and closed written and
document discovery.215
When framing the new Rule 26(b)(1), the Advisory Committee
could not have asked for a more perfect case than Sibley to support
the necessity of decreasing the scope of discovery.216 If destined “to
207.

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

A Westlaw case search performed on November 17, 2017, revealed that fifteen
Kentucky Federal District Court orders cite to Oppenheimer to define the rule’s
scope.
Combined, these states account for approximately 54% of the case law perpetuating
the Oppenheimer standard. See supra notes 201–07.
See discussion infra Section V.B.
See supra notes 193–200 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 212–32 and accompanying text.
No. CV 14-634 (JS)(AYS), 2015 WL 9413101, at *2, *7 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2015).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2010)).
Id. at *7–8.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2015 amendment (“The present
amendment again reflects the need for continuing and close judicial involvement in
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deal with the problem of over-discovery,”217 then Sibley would serve
as one of the first cases of over-discovery reined in by the new Rule
26(b)(1).218 Many other courts would follow Sibley’s lead, adopting
not only the words of the new rule, but framing them in the Advisory
Committee’s intent.219 Two decisions that help to outline and guide
the application of the new Rule 26(b)(1) were both signed in
September 2016.220
1.

In re Bard IVC Filters Products Liability Litigation

The first guiding case is Judge David G. Campbell’s decision in In
Judge
re Bard IVC Filters Products Liability Litigation.221
Campbell’s decision is not just enlightening because of its analysis,
but because he is also the Chair of the Advisory Committee on the
Rules of Civil Procedure that spearheaded and designed the 2015
amendments.222 The decision focuses on a dispute between the
parties as to the “discoverability of certain electronically stored
information . . . generated by foreign entities.”223 Judge Campbell
breaks his analysis into two parts: relevance and proportionality
under the new rule.224 As for relevance, the decision reiterates that
the “reasonably calculated” standard no longer has any bearing on
discovery.225 The decision continues, in frustration, by listing
multiple decisions that are still citing to this old standard,226 and even
points out two decisions that turned to the old standard within the
Ninth Circuit.227 Judge Campbell concluded that the amended rule

217.
218.
219.

220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

the cases that do not yield readily to the ideal of effective party management. . . .
[T]here will be important occasions for judicial management, both when the parties
are legitimately unable to resolve important differences and when the parties fall
short of effective, cooperative management on their own.”).
Id.
See Sibley, 2015 WL 9413101, at *7 (applying the new Rule 26(b)(1) proportionality
standard in their denial of extensive discovery requests by the plaintiff).
See, e.g., Arcelormittal Ind. Harbor LLC v. Amex Nooter, LLC, No. 2:15-CV-195PRC, 2016 WL 614144, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 16, 2016); Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1791-RCJ-VCF, 2016 WL 526225, at *8 (D. Nev. Feb. 9, 2016);
Siriano v. Goodman Mfg. Co., L.P., No. 2:14-cv-1131, 2015 WL 8259548, at *6 n.5
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 9, 2015).
See infra notes 221–32 and accompanying text.
317 F.R.D. 562 (D. Ariz. 2016).
Genetin, supra note 53, at 671.
In re Bard, 317 F.R.D. at 563.
Id. at 563–66.
Id. at 563–64.
Id. at 564 n.1.
Id. at 564.
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abrogated the old standard and any case law created by its
interpretation.228
2.

Cole’s Wexford Hotel, Inc. v. Highmark Inc.

The second guiding case is Cole’s Wexford Hotel, Inc. v. Highmark
Inc.229 Cole’s Wexford’s importance in the adoption of the new
26(b)(1) stems from its comprehensive historical analysis of the rule
and ultimate conclusion that Oppenheimer is no longer controlling.230
Cole’s Wexford follows the suggestion by a special master that the
court deny plaintiffs’ requests for materials concerning approved
insurance rates and the actual amounts charged by the insurer
defendant.231 The multi-paged historical breakdown of Rule 26(b),
followed by an in-depth analysis on the continued application of old
case law in defining the new Rule 26(b)(1), will hopefully serve as a
guide to other courts reviewing requests under the new scope.232
V. HAVE WE ACTUALLY GOTTEN “SOMETHING DONE”?233
The Duke Conference correctly concluded that amendments to the
Rules were not the only solution, but must be supplemented with
education.234 Continued judicial education on Rule 26(b)(1), as well
as judicial case management, have a major role in correcting the
Oppenheimer problem.235 But judicial education alone will not be
enough, and high court guidance is needed to set the scope of
discovery straight.236
A. Education and Pilot Programs
Education and pilot programs are crucial in achieving the goals of
the amendments.237 Most programs are already underway.238 The
Duke Conference Report suggested training, drafting manuals, and
developing practice guides to help facilitate the change.239 Following
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See id.
209 F. Supp. 3d 810 (W.D. Pa. 2016), on reconsideration sub nom. Cole’s Wexford
Hotel, Inc. v. UPMC, No. 10-1609, 2017 WL 432947 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2017).
Id. at 817–23.
Id. at 812.
See id. at 817–23.
2015 YEAR-END REPORT, supra note 1, at 11.
2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 84, at 4.
See id.
See infra Section V.C.
2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 84, at 4.
See infra notes 239–49 and accompanying text.
2010 DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 84, at 4, 10.
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the Duke Conference, the Duke Law School Center for Judicial
Studies published and has maintained its “Guidelines and Practices
for Implementing the 2015 Discovery Amendments to Achieve
Proportionality.”240 The American Bar Association Section of
Litigation partnered with the Duke Law Center for Judicial Studies to
conduct a seventeen-city series of symposiums, called the “Rules
Amendments Roadshow,” to help educate the bench and bar on the
amendments.241 In addition to the symposium series, the Roadshow
provided resources concerning the amendments on their website, and
even created podcasts.242 Moreover, the Federal Judicial Center
continues to conduct workshops on the discovery amendments.243
Multiple pilot programs to test new ideas on case management and
discovery are growing and more district judges are heeding the call of
the Supreme Court to participate.244 Two pilot programs were
unanimously recommended by the Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure to be sent to the Judicial Conference for approval.245
The first is a Mandatory Initial Discovery Pilot Program, which will
“test a system of mandatory initial discovery requests to be adopted
in each participating court.”246 The second is the Expedited
Procedures Pilot Program, designed to increase judicial education and
use of procedural and logistical tools to increase the speed of
litigation.247 Both programs began in spring 2017 and will last for
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three years.248 So far, ten districts have expressed some degree of
interest in one or both of the pilot programs.249 Despite the multiple
educational opportunities, the impact seems curbed and
misapplications continue.250
B. A Curbed Impact
Although it is incredibly difficult to definitively say, the new Rule
26(b)(1) seems to be narrowing the scope of discovery.251 A
comprehensive analysis of the first six months of proportionality
provided many insights into application of the new Rule 26(b)(1).252
First, as time progressed, so did the frequency of proportionality
analyses.253 In the first two months of proportionality, the concept
was only reviewed in thirty-five cases.254 After 180 days of
proportionality, 142 opinions had applied the concept.255 That is a
three-fold increase in application.256 Such an increase could have
several explanations; one possibility is that the timeframe has
allowed for more parties to brief the issue of proportionality.257
Another explanation may be that the longer the proportionality is
controlling, the more familiar the bench and bar will become with the
concept, and the more likely the bench will be to frame their
decisions using a proportionality lens.258
Second, despite increased application of proportionality, available
data suggests a minimal increase in discovery restrictions under the
concept.259 One report by the Federal Litigator suggests that
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proportionality is not making the “splash” many foresaw.260 Taking a
six-month sample size of federal discovery decisions pre-amendment,
the report found that courts restricted at least one aspect of discovery
in 56% of cases.261 Post-amendment, courts have restricted some
aspect of a discovery request in just 61% of cases.262 Despite
arguably drastic alterations to the scope of discovery, in the first six
months, courts have only narrowed discovery by 5%.263 So while
some cases are likely being decided differently under the new
standard, the impact has not been as large as expected.264
The difficulty is that one cannot determine if courts are truly
reaching different results because of proportionality, or are just
reaching the same result as they would have prior to the amendments,
but for different reasons.265 Furthermore, the extent of the rule
remains unknown because data concerning the time and costs of
litigation are unavailable. But one thing is certain, while invocation
of proportionality has not drastically altered the scope of
discovery,266 its impact has also been hindered by the continued use
of old case law defining a broad scope of relevance.267
C. Guidance from Above
Despite the educational programming and perceived narrowing of
the scope of discovery,268 Rule 26(b)(1) has yet to achieve its full
potential.269 Slow institutional progression of the judiciary and
educational programming aside, one thing is certain—the continued
use of old case law defining a broad scope of discovery will hinder
success.270 Proportionality needs the aid of the appellate courts. As
of right now, the “relevance” and “proportionality” standards of the
new Rule 26(b)(1) are dichotomously applied.271 Old case law
260.
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details “relevance” as broad and liberal.272 But proportionality is
fluid, both restricting and broad depending on the case.273 The
Advisory Committee did not intend a disjointed application, but
designed the new Rule to focus discovery and ultimately reduce
costs.274 This sentiment becomes most apparent in Judge Campbell’s
In re Bard decision.275 If the Advisory Committee intended for
Oppenheimer to retain its control over the scope of discovery, the
Chairman would have utilized the holding.276 Instead, Judge
Campbell dismissed the use of Oppenheimer as an “[o]ld habit[]” and
cited to ten cases that incorrectly used the old case law in August
2016 alone.277
The courts, however, should not be solely faulted for this
misapplication. Many factors could have led to this
misapplication,278 but perhaps the most obvious is the silence of the
Advisory Committee’s notes. The notes detail proportionality and
the removed standards, but provide little guidance on “relevance”
under the new 26(b)(1).279 The silence inevitably led courts to case
law. Judicial education is key in proper application, but the full
intent of the Advisory Committee will not be realized until new case
law is created.280 Until higher courts determine if Oppenheimer and
its ilk are still applicable, the split in Rule 26(b)(1)’s application will
continue to grow. And as the split grows, the Rule’s full effect on
costs and time will remain unfulfilled.
VI. CONCLUSION
Proportionality is making inroads, but its full potential to rein in
costs and time remains unknown. On one hand, there has not been
enough time to gather meaningful data on any impact to the cost or
time of discovery.281 But on the other, one does not need data to
determine the hurdle inhibiting the intended narrowing. Cases like
Oppenheimer, that define relevance through the language of the
former Rule 26(b)(1), provide for a broad and liberal scope of
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discovery.282 The inclusion of proportionality and the removal of
former standards in the new Rule 26(b)(1) were all in an effort to
narrow the scope of discovery.283
For better or for worse, the Advisory Committee intended the new
rule to narrow the scope of discovery.284 Continued education of the
bench and bar will foster the needed environment for the new scope
to take hold,285 but at the end of the day the reasons why Chief
Justice Roberts’s analogized litigators to duelers still exist.286 As
long as litigators can still argue that “relevance” is very broad, they
will. The continued use of the old case law by the district courts will
only fuel this debate and will hopefully expedite this question’s
inevitable determination by the appellate courts. Without this
necessary guidance, the split will grow and the full potential of Rule
26(b)(1) will remain lost.
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